東郷茂徳「在米大使館員が何を考えていたのか謎」〜全てはうやむや・「簡潔に通告」すべきだった対米宣戦布告:不必要に長すぎる対米覚書〜|リメンバー・パール・ハーバー78・時代の一面・真珠湾奇襲攻撃

前回は「「対米宣戦布告」手交遅延の真の実態〜大使館員怠慢による「不愉快な事件」・「開戦三十分前」をゴリ押しした軍令部・「薄氷踏む思い」対米宣戦布告〜」の話でした。

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「簡潔に通告」すべきだった対米宣戦布告:不必要に長すぎる対米覚書

New Global Voyage
「東郷茂徳外交手記 時代の一面」(東郷茂徳 著、明治百年史業書、新地球未来紀行)

対米線開戦前後の状況を、開戦時、敗戦時に外務大臣だった東郷茂徳は克明に記録に残しています。

新地球紀行
真珠湾奇襲攻撃(歴史街道2021年12月号 PHP研究所)

「卑怯者ジャップによる騙し討ち」とずっと言われている、真珠湾奇襲攻撃。

この「騙し討ち」は「奇襲攻撃」を超えて、「宣戦布告通告前」となってしまったことが原因です。

東郷茂徳

ただし、ここに今一つ不愉快なる
事件にふれなくてはならない。

東郷茂徳

それは、対米通告が
遅延したことである。

東郷茂徳は「対米通告遅延」の事実を、粛々と語っています。

Memorandum (Japan’s Note to the United States of America December 7, 1941, Fourteen Part Message)
Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan

MEMORANDUM

I. The government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific Area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measure the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

II. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan’s true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pace with Germany and Italy.

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan’s constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan’s aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regimes. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its Protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British Governments, willfully misinterpreting it as a threat to their own possessions and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential questions.

III. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present Cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress. Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Government of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the South Eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as “introducer” of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American Government not only rejected the abovementioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as so-called “introducer” of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

IV. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China question which constitutes an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third Powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation. It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.

On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, cause undue delay in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points:

  1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another’s position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one’s selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world’s actual condition it seems only a utopian ideal, on the part of the American Government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

  1. The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: “Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third Powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.” It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy- two Powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific Area through peaceful means.

  1. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic powers. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane that military pressure.
  2. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position in has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan’s fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above- mentioned American policy. Thus the six countries- Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China and Thailand- excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.

  1. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan’s position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiations. This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

V. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan’s sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire’s existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

VI. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime in the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan’s position.

VII. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan’s effort toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that, in view of the attitude of the American Government, it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

上の通り、とにかく「長すぎた」対米宣戦布告通達文。

どう考えても、この1/10程度の分量で十分でした。

当時の大日本帝国からすれば、「大義名分をきちんと明らかに」という思いがあったことは、十分にわかります。

ところが、「ある国の大義名分」は、他の国にとっては「納得しかねる」ことが多いのが現実です。

この点においては、もっとシンプルに「簡潔に宣戦布告通告」すべきでした。

東郷茂徳「在米大使館員が何を考えていたのか謎」:全てはうやむや

New Global Voyage
対米戦開始時の対米外交責任者:左上から時計回りに、東郷茂徳 外務大臣、来栖三郎 特別大使、野村吉三郎 米大使(Wikipedia)
東郷茂徳

即ち、両大使は訓電により
午後一時国務長官と会見の約束を取り付けたが、

東郷茂徳

其時迄に電報の浄書が出来ないので、
二時過ぎに初めて国務省に到着し、

東郷茂徳

二時二十分から会見した
と云うのである。

東郷茂徳

館員の怠慢と過失は右によって明らかとなるが、
外務省官吏の普通の執務振としては、

東郷茂徳

かくの如く局面が急迫した時には
館員から二、三名は夜勤せしめて

東郷茂徳

電報は徹夜して解読し、重要なるものは
夜中といえども館員に閲読せしむるのが

東郷茂徳

自分等が永い間訓育せられた
処であった。

東郷茂徳

又此際、米国側にては、覚書の一部一部が
傍受せられて分かるに従い、

東郷茂徳

軍首脳者、国務長官のみならず
大統領迄も閲読して、

東郷茂徳

第十三部の所で、「之は戦争を意味する」と
云ったとさえ云うのであるが、

東郷茂徳

日本の両大使は、大使館でも六日夜には
既に解読せられたと云う覚書の大部分を

東郷茂徳

同日中に閲読しなかったのだろうか、
閲読したとして自体の重大を悟らなかったというのであろうか。

とにかく、戦後の時点においても、外相であった東郷茂徳は、「在米大使館員が何を考えていたのか謎」という状況でありました。

これは、極めて異常なことであり、少なくとも、対米戦開戦後、

Roosevelt

昨日、
1941年12月7日・・・

Roosevelt

この日は、恥辱として
記憶に刻まれるあろう日・・・

Roosevelt

我がUSは、Japanese Empire(大日本帝国)の
海軍・空軍による・・・

Roosevelt

意図的な
奇襲攻撃を受けました!

Roosevelt

Japanの要請により、
同国政府・Emperorとの対話を続けてきた・・・

Roosevelt

最近、ハル国務長官が
送った書簡に対して・・・

Roosevelt

駐米Japan大使は、公式回答書を
Hull長官に提出してきた・・・

Roosevelt

しかし、Japanの政府の文書には、
戦争や武力攻撃の警告・暗示は全くなかった!

Roosevelt

ハワイと日本の距離を
考えれば・・・

Roosevelt

昨日の攻撃は、数日前、あるいは数週間前から
計画されていたことは明らかである!

Roosevelt

この間、日本政府は「持続的平和を希望する」
という偽りの声明と表現で・・・

Roosevelt

我がUSを、故意に
欺いてきたのです!

Roosevelt

Hawaii諸島に対する、Japan海軍の攻撃は
我がUSの海軍に甚大な損害を与えた!

Roosevelt

Japanは、Hawaiiに加え、香港・グアム・
フィリピン・ウェイクを攻撃した!

Roosevelt

私は我がUS陸海軍の最高指揮官として、
あらゆる措置を講ずるよう命令を下した!

Roosevelt

米国民は、正義の力を持ってして、
必ずや勝利をもたらしてみせる!

Roosevelt

議会に
対して要請する!

Roosevelt

1941年12月7日(現地時間)、Japanの
一方的かつ卑劣な攻撃が開始されたため・・・

Roosevelt

我がUSと日本の間に戦争が生じた
ことを認め、 USが参戦することを!

ルーズベルト大統領が、このように議会で日本を避難した際に、在米大使館員の動きは全てチェックするべきでした。

そして、その上で、在米大使館員全員に厳罰を与えるべきであった大日本帝国政府。

ところが、日本らしく「すべてはうやむや」となり、外相だった東郷茂徳すら「意味不明」だったのでした。

この点は、日本人としては、悔やんでも悔やみきれない事実となりました。

そして、外務省及び在米大使館員の超怠慢によって、日本及び日本人にとって、巨大な十字架が背負わされる結果となりました。

New Global Voyage

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